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Conflicts Law-State or Federal?t
GENE R. SHREVE*

I am delighted to join my colleagues in observing through this symposium
the sesquicentennial anniversary of the Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. The editors have asked us to select topics that look well
into the future. This paper considers possibilities that state law, which
currently dominates the subject of conflicts, might be displaced by federal
law
Should federal law come to dominate, the change would matter for several
reasons. It would require a substantial expenditure of resources to make and
enforce federal conflicts law Growth of federal conflicts law would curtail
state judges' authority to sort out the conflicts problems in their cases. In
addition, the shift would necessarily alter the content of conflicts law How
much change will occur is an interesting source for speculation. How much
should occur is a different and complicated question. This Article considers
both.

I. THE SETTING
The purpose of conflicts law is to provide an intelligible and principled
basis for choosing a substantive rule (perhaps tort or contract) over the
competing rule of another place.' Rules compete when their application
would lead to conflicting results and when the relation of each place to the
controversy is such that it is plausible for the rule of either place to govern.
Conflicts law must legitimate the choice. It must explain why rejection of one
law in favor of another is right.
This is sometimes called a horizontal conflicts model. Rules are on the same
plane in the sense that neither must apply merely because it is applicable. The
terms "conflict of laws" and "choice of law" most often apply to this
situation. The horizontal model, however, does not describe conflicts between

t © Copyright 1993 by Gene I Shreve. All rights reserved.

* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I wish to thank those who
made helpful comments on the manuscript: Patrick Borchers, John Kozyris, Larry Kramer, William
Reynolds, and William Richman. I take sole credit, of course, for any aspect of the Article that troubles
the reader. Thanks finally to Michael Greene, Class of 1994, for his research assistance.
1. For the sake of simplicity, this paper takes as its model the conflicts case where choice is
between forum law and that of one other place. The great majority of cases fit this model, but of course
there are cases where forum law is but one of three or more possible choices, or where forum law is
not a contending choice at all.
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state and federal law The latter are sometimes called vertical conflicts,2
although to think of them as conflicts at all may be confusing. The mere
applicability of valid federal law resolves the conflict at once, because the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution' displaces state law Choice between
conflicting laws poses no difficulty in the vertical realm; however, as this
paper illustrates, significant questions arise there concerning the legitimate
bounds of federal law-making authority and the policy wisdom of displacing
state with federal law when authority to make the latter exists.

II. WHY STATE LAW DOMINATES THE SUBJECT
Business and leisure activities have become more interstate or international
in character throughout this century Conflicts issues in civil litigation have
increased accordingly ' Even so, American legal institutions have never
rushed to make conflicts law State law dominates due only to the forbearance
of the Supreme Court and Congress.
The United States Supreme Court could have greatly influenced the
development and content of conflicts law through constitutional adjudication.
The Court did just that in cases on personal jurisdiction, a field with
important similarities to conflicts. s Most significant personal jurisdiction
questions today revolve around the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 Similarly, much of the sphere of conflicts law could be filled

2. Classic descriptions of horizontal and vertical choice of law appear in ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN
& DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 995, 1038-41 (1965).

3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
4. Naturally, laws do not always conflict. However, despite the efforts of groups like the
Commissioners on Uniform State Law and the American Law Institute, states within our federal system
(not to mention sovereigns elsewhere) often rest their substantive rules on different and conflicting
judgments about how justice should be served. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidationof Complex
Litigation:A CriticalEvaluation of the ALI Proposal,10 J.L. & CoM. 1, 23 (1990) ("The conflict of
laws question has become even more pressing in recent years, for as states have passed tort reform
statutes, the divergence in substantive law among them has increased accordingly.").
5. Similarities (and differences) between personal jurisdiction and conflicts are examined in Peter
Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 9 (1988); Peter Hay, The
Interrelationof Jurisdictionand Choice ofLaw in United States Conflicts Law, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
161 (1979); Alfred Hill, Choice of Law andJurisdictionin the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960
(1981); Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifyng Theoryfor JudicialJurisdictionand Choice
ofLaw, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (1991); James Martin, PersonalJurisdiction and Choice ofLaw, 78
MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980); Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdictionand
Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869 (1981).
6. An account of this development appears in GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,
UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 12-19 (1989).
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by more aggressive readings of the Full Faith and Credit, 7 Due Process,8
Commerce, 9 Equal Protection,10 and Privileges and Immunities" Clauses.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could use these clauses and other federal
law-making inspirations to lead a federal common-law movement that would
nationalize conflicts law 12 Or, Congress could take over matters by codifying some or all of conflicts law 13
Law-making initiatives are perceptible at each of these levels,"4 but barely
so. The Supreme Court and Congress have largely foregone opportunities to

7. On possibilities under full faith and credit, see, for example, Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1945); James A. Martin,
ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976); James R. Pielemeier,
Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and Creditto Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and FullFaith and Credit in Choice
of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Choice ofLaw:
The Priorityof Fairnessover Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative
Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law
Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971); P. John Kozyns, Some Observationson State Regulation of
Multistate Takeovers-ControllingChoice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L.
499 (1989).
10. See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.34 (2d ed. 1992);
Brainerd Cume & Herma H. Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960).
11. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Harold W. Horowitz, Towarda FederalCommon Law of Choice of Law-A Suggested
Approach, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967); Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice
of Law and FederalCommon Law, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977, at 105.
This suggestion may run counter to the view of a few commentators that federal common-law power

is preempted by the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, FederalCommon Law, Political
Legitimacy, and the InterpretiveProcess: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761,
786-90 (1989). For a persuasive rejection of that view, see Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power ofthe
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Louise Weinberg, The CuriousNotion that the Rules of
DecisionAct Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 860 (1989); Louise Weinberg,
FederalCommon Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Drainingthe DismalSwamp: The Case for Federal Choice
ofLaw Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1991) ("Congress has the constitutional power to legislate [choice-oflaw] rules, but has failed to exercise that power for two centuries."); Ralph J. Whitten, The
ConstitutionalLimitations on State Choice ofLaw: Due Process,9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 851, 917-18
(1982).

14. Thus the Supreme Court periodically invokes the constitutional law of full faith and credit or
due process to constrain choice of law. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)
(invoking both). A small amount of federal conflicts doctrine has materialized through the exercise of
federal question and admiraltyjunsdiction. E.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580 (1973); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.,
221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). In addition, Congress has lately demonstrated interest in codifying conflicts
rules for a few specific areas. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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shape conflicts law,' 5 leaving the task to the states. State legislatures usually
enjoy law-making supremacy over their state courts 6 comparable to that
which Congress enjoys over the federal courts. 7 Therefore, the task of
making state conflicts law passes first to them.' 1 Yet state judges usually
receive little or no statutory guidance in grappling with conflicts problems. 9
By default then, state judges decide most of the conflicts issues in their cases
by administering state common law
Most federal decisions are grounded in state common law as well. Federal
cases that have an interstate dimension sufficient to present conflicts issues
usually rest on diversity jurisdiction, and the Erte doctrine treats conflicts law
as part of the state law that federal diversity judges must apply 20

15. In contrast, the European Community has developed for member nations uniform rules
pertaining to contracts. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 10, at 46; see Samuel Cohen, The EEC Convention
and U.S. Law Governing Choice of Law for Contracts, with ParticularEmphasis on the Restatement
Second: A ComparativeStudy, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 223 (1989).
16. "In the division of responsibilities represented by the constitutional separation of powers, the
legislature calls the main policy turns and the courts must respect its pronouncements." REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 67 (1975); see also P.S. ATIYAH
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 8-9 (1987); G. ALAN TARR
& MARY C. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 52-53 (1988).
17. For example, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981), the Supreme Court
announced that the "paramount authority of Congress" nullified federal common law that the Court had
announced only a year before.
18. "A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state
on choice of law." I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(l) (1971).
19. Choice-of-law provisions at times appear in uniform state laws. Section 1-105(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, discussed in Thomas G. Ryan, ReasonableRelation and Party Autonomy Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 219 (1979), is an example. At times, borrowing statutes
and workers' compensation statutes will also direct choice of law. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choiceof-Law Revolution: An EmpiricalStudy, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 357, 370 (1992). Two junsdictions
with civil code traditions have approached conflicts codification on a broad scale. See Symeon C.
Symeonides, Louisiana'sNew Law of Choice ofLaw for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REv.
677 (1992); Symeon C. Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico's Conflicts Law: A Preview, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 413 (1990). Other jurisdictions, however, usually leave state judges to search for
common-law solutions. It is still possible to observe, as the American Law Institute did in 1971, that
"[a] court will rarely find that a question of choice of law is explicitly covered by statute." 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 6(l) cmt. b (1971).

20. The rule, which comes from Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), was and
is controversial (see, for example, views surveyed in Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law
Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327, 339
(1982), and in Gen J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The ContinuingErie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1 (1988)). However, the Supreme Court has not wavered in applying the Klaxon rule. E.g., Ferens
v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
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III. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING CONFLICTS LAW
It scarcely adds to the lustre of conflicts law to realize that state courts
contribute most of its content because they alone cannot avoid the task.
Matters are even worse. Those of us who study conflicts must regret that it
is law frequently unpopular with lawyers, judges, law students, and even law
professors.2' It is not entirely clear why this is so;22 but chief among the
reasons must be the daunting nature of the subject:23 difficulties in framing
issues, in deciding between complex and, at times, contradictory approaches24
to a solution, and in applying the approach selected to the facts of the case.
These difficulties erode consensus about what conflicts law is or ought to be.
Moreover, because the forum state for the conflicts decision usually is also
a contending law source, choice of local law in close cases often fosters
cynicism.

It might be best to elaborate on this rather charitable view of modem
conflicts law, since it accounts for some of the skepticism with which I
discuss reform initiatives over the rest of this Article.
Conflicts law is far from perfect. However, particular flaws have less to do
with its unpopularity than one might think. Rather, it is the innate difficulties
of analysis that have made conflicts controversial and have kept it that way
It may be a sad fact of human nature that the difficulty of a legal question is
demonstrated less by agreement on that score among judges and commentators

21. William Prosser spoke for many academic lawyers, then and now, when he called the subject
"a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mystenous matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon." William L. Prosser,
InterstatePublication,51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
22. For an attempt to describe the related difficulties of conflicts teaching, see Gene R. Shreve,
Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1672 (1992).
23. Difficulties associated with conflicts analysis have long been recognized. E.g., BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928) (noting that conflicts is "one of the most
baffling subjects of legal science); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND

MULTISTATE JUSTICE

1 (1993) ("Alas, in spite of all the valiant intellectual efforts lavished on it,and the voluminous literature
that has built up over the ages, the law of conflicts remains mired in mystery and confusion."); Max
Rheinstem, How to Review a Festschrift, II AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 655 (1962) (reviewing TWENTIETH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW (Kurt Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961) (deeming conflicts
the "most difficult and most confused of all branches of the law")). But see Larry Kramer, More Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict ofLaws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 247 (199 1) (suggesting
a need to "reorient choice-of-law analysis by viewing it in its ordinary procedural context," where it is
merely part of "the process of defining the elements of a claim or defense').
24. Shreve, supra note 22, at 1673-77; cf. Arthur T. von Mehren, Choice ofLaw and the Problem
ofJustice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27,27 (1977) ("Those who work in the field of choice of law are,
at times, discouraged by the apparently intractable nature of the problems with which they must grapple.
Intricate and subtle analyses are undertaken; ambiguities and uncertainties are painfully resolved.
Ultimately, a result is reached, yet the solution is too frequently neither entirely satisfying nor fully
convincing.').
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than by the rising decibel level of arguments over who is obviously right and
obviously wrong. The prevailing approach to resolving conflicts-whatever
that approach then happens to be-will always be under attack.
Curiously little of the conflicts debate concerns what basic choice-of-law
values should be. That appears largely settled. Policies guiding modem theory
embrace the same core concerns that exerted an unacknowledged influence
under old theory, 25 which always should have mattered-that we should
consider the purpose and intended reach of rules vying for application; 26 try
to avoid choices that unfairly surprise a litigant;27 and be sensitive to the
needs of interstate federalism and international cooperation.2" What conflicts
debates often do concern is whether courts are (or can be made to be) true to
those values-matters of jurisprudence and judicial process. Specifically,
reactions to modern conflicts theory vary according to one's attitude toward
judicial realism.29 Those of us more sympathetic to judicial realism are

25. Under the old approach,
doctrine had usually been indifferent to the purposes of laws or to particular needs of
litigants. It rested instead upon an increasingly unconvincingjunsprudence, a vested-rights
formalism similar in its way to jurisdictional doctrine most often associated with
Pennoyer v. Neff [95 U.S. 714 (1877)]. Geographical inquiries dominated both fields. For
Pennoyer the question was whether service of process was completed (as it had to be) in
the forum state. Under traditional conflicts doctrine, the choice of law was governed by
such facts as the location of physical injury or the place of contracting.
Shreve, supra note 22, at 1673-74 (citation omitted). Evolution to modem theory completed the parallel:
Pennoyer's dominance ended when the Supreme Court began permitting personal
jurisdiction in forums where service of process could not be completed. [International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).] The conflicts revolution came only a
short time later, when a significant number of courts decided that geographical indicators
such as place of injury or place of contracting would not necessarily dictate the source
of governing law. As with the modification of personal jurisdiction rules, changes in
choice of law doctrine reflected a shift from hard-and-fast rules to approaches that were
far-ranging, supple, and policy-based.
1d. at 1674.
26. "Without taking the content of the conflicting laws into account, how could one know what
would satisfy the demands of justice or the requirements of policy9"' DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICEOF-LAw PROCESS 9 (1965).
27. See Rheinstem, supra note 23, at 656.
28. For two good inventories of modem conflicts policies, including those summarized in the text,
see I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971) and ROBERT A. LEFLAR Er AL.,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 290-300 (4th ed. 1986).
29. On modem conflicts analysis as a species of judicial realism, see Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (1991); Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look
at Choice of Law, 44 VAND. L. REv. 827, 841-43 (1991) (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991)); cf Russell J. Weintraub, Peter Hay's
InternationalPerspective, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 19, 19 (noting the view that modem conflicts theory
rests on "parochialism, realism and academicism"). Realism in conflicts theory can be traced back at
least as far as the work of Walter Wheeler Cook. Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924). A useful synopsis of Cook's critique of traditional conflicts
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inclined to approve of the tendency of modem theory to deny judges
sanctuary in territorial or other mechanical rules and to force them instead to
grapple with choice-of-law values out in the open.3" Conclusions are not
always reached with eclat. Opposing results in close cases may each in their
turn be defensible. But to condemn modem conflicts theory for this is to
yearn for intellectual anesthesia.
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING BOTH THE REFORM AND
THE ELIMINATION OF STATE CONFLICTS LAW
The present climate has produced a variety of attacks on state conflicts law
When critics argue them to an audience general enough to include state judges
and legislators, they may be urging that state law reform itself. Less obvious,
and a focus of this Article, is the realization that most of these attacks are
also suited for an entirely different purpose. A particular argument for
reforming state conflicts law can also underpin a federal law alternative.
Critics have in this sense a second means of venting their displeasure: to
argue that, if state courts are unwilling to mend their ways, either Congress
or the Supreme Court should use its power under the Constitution to trump
state conflicts law
Thus, it is useful to preface closer examination of possibilities for federal
conflicts law with a look at the controversy surrounding state law reform.
Critics frequently target interest analysis, the pivot upon which conflicts
decisions often turn.3 Briefly, interest analysis works the following way
When the facts of the controversy clearly implicate the concerns (policies)
responsible for the creation of a substantive rule of law, a result in the case
that is incompatible with the substantive rule frustrates those policies. The
DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 296-98 (1990). On Cook's place in
the realist movement, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1230, 1234, 1257 (1931); Robert S. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism in
Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and CritiqueofOurDomimantGeneralTheory
About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 864 (1981).

doctrine appears in

30. Cf.Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 1, 127 (1989) ("Conflicts cases present
us with real conflicts among competing norms and interests, and among the social visions of separate
normative and political communities."). These complications can throw judges and observers off balance,
and "one who expects to achieve results in multistate cases that are as satisfying in terms of standards
of justice and of party acceptibility as those reached in purely domestic cases is doomed to
disappointment." von Mehren, supra note 24, at 42.
31. One expert, while not enamored with interest analysis, described it as "the methodology which,
in all its permutations, has dominated the conflicts agenda for the last quarter century and deconstructed
"P. John Kozyns, Foreward-Symposium on Interest Analysis
traditional conflicts in most states.
in Conflict ofLaws, 46 OHIO ST. L.J 457, 457 (1985).
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sovereign 32 creating the rule is then interested in the outcome; interested in
having its substantive rule applied.33
A number of critics appear to distrust interest analysis in general, 34 and
two of its manifestations have drawn particular fire. First, courts have used
interest analysis to choose forum law over that of another more interested
place. These decisions deny life to stronger policies implicated by nonforum
law 35
36
The California Supreme Court took this approach in Nevada v. Hall,
choosing its own law over Nevada's to facilitate recovery for California tort
plaintiffs in an accident case. The California Supreme Court's conclusion that
the state was interested in applying its pro-recovery law was not difficult to
reach, since plaintiffs were Californians, and since the accident occurred
there.
Yet Nevada seemed more interested in the application of its sovereign
immunity law defeating liability Respect for the sovereignty of a law source
always supports an interest-based argument in conflict cases, but that
argument is usually proffered by private litigants for private gain. 37 Nevada's
position was quite different. The defendant was not merely a beneficiary of
the policy behind Nevada's antirecovery law, it was the sovereign responsible

32. This may be one of the fifty states or a foreign government. If the latter, it may be the foreign
government as a whole or a federated unit within that government.
33. "Interest analysis, by and large, is simply traditional purposive reasoning." Louise Weinberg,
Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L.REV. 683, 689. For more on interest analysis,
see Patrick J. Borchers, ProfessorBrilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 465,470-74; Gene
R. Shreve, Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis-Has It Become a Paper Tiger?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
541 (1985). For an illuminating demonstration of interest analysis in operation, see William M.
Richman, DiagrammingConflicts: A Graphic Understandingof InterestAnalysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317
(1982).
34. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, GovernmentalInterest Analysis: A House Without Foundations,46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 459 (1985); Gottesman, supra note 13; Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509
(1985); Kozyns, supra note 31; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 277
(1990). At the same time, interest analysis has its champions. E.g., Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law:
Interest Analysis and Its "New Critics," 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681 (1988); Robert A. Sedler, Interest
Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER
L. REv. 593 (1983); David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis or the Restatement Second of Conflicts:
Which is the PreferableApproach to Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems?,27 DuQ. L. REv. 73 (1988);
Weinberg, supra note 29; Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of InterestAnalysis in the Conflict ofLaws
and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493 (1985).
35. At times, such results also appear to be out of line with the reasonable expectations of the losing
party. For discussion of how these two factors may combine, see Gene R. Shreve, InterestAnalysis as
ConstitutionalLaw, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1987).
36. 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
37. The plaintiffs' position in Hall was typical in this respect. They sought private gain (increased
net worth through damage recovery) by demonstrating that the policies accounting for California's prorecovery law were implicated by the facts of the case. Therefore, they were appropriate beneficiaries of
that law.
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for that law This made Nevada acutely interested, about as interested a law
source as one could imagine.3"
Second, interest analysis also draws heavy fire where it causes forum state
litigants to win cases that out-of-state litigants might have lost. Such cases
raise the awkward prospect that forum citizenship confers upon the litigants
different and better substantive rights.
The New York case, Tooker v. Lopez, 39 is a well-known example. The case
arose from an automobile accident in Michigan that took the lives of the
driver and one passenger in the car, both New Yorkers. Susan Silk, the other
passenger and a citizen of Michigan, was seriously injured but survived. The
administrator of the passenger-decedent brought a wrongful death action in
New York state court against the estate of the driver-decedent. The question
in the case was whether Michigan's guest statute, insulating drivers from
negligence claims by their passenger guests, was available to the defendant.
New York law imposed no disability on negligence recovery 4
Rejecting the Michigan statute in favor of its own law, the New York Court
of Appeals placed considerable weight on the New York citizenship of the
decedent and her family "New York's 'grave concern' in affording recovery
for the injuries suffered by Catharina Tooker, a New York domiciliary, and
the loss suffered by her family as a result of her wrongful death, is evident
,,at
Had Susan Silk next filed suit, the New York Court might have
applied the Michigan statute to deny her negligence claim. Because she was
not a New Yorker, she could not make the interest argument for New York
law based on citizenship that was so instrumental to the decision in Tooker
These two applications of interest analysis are not the same, 42 but they can
coalesce. That is, a court will discount the greater interest of a nonforum law

38. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, left no doubt that California was free to reject Nevada law,
so long as California was interested in applying its own. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1978). For
studies of Hall, see Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State &
FederalLaw, 79 MICH. L. Rav. 1315 (1981); Donald Olenick, Note, Sovereign Immunity in Sister-State
Courts: Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law Solutions, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 1493 (1980).
39. 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).

40. Id. at 398.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. It is possible for the first of the two targets for criticism to occur without the second. That is,
the forum may choose its own law over that of another more interested place when the beneficiary of
that law is not a citizen of the forum. This is because factors other than citizenship may generate state
interest. E.g., Fells v. Bowman, 274 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1973) (noting Louisiana's interest in having its
safety regulations apply regarding an accident there, although all the parties were from Mississippi).

Forum interest of this sort comes from the fact that events underlying the controversy occurred in the
forum state. See John B. Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of
Domicile, 1983 UTAH L. REV.651, 673-74; Shreve, supra note 35, at 67; Weinberg, supra note 29, at

67.
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source in order to secure for a local litigant the benefits of local law Nevada
v Hall was such a case.
Other attacks on modern theory are not aimed as directly at interest
analysis. Critics chafe at the open-ended, methodological approach whereby
many state conflicts jurisdictions administer modem choice-of-law principles43 unaided by many hard-and-fast rules." Critics also contend that, so
long as the power to forge conflicts doctrine is scattered among so many
sovereigns, conflicts law will remain a hopeless patchwork.4 5 American
courts do not respond uniformly to conflicts issues. The result, they say, is
that current law promotes uncertainty, forum shopping, and procedural
redundancies. 4 Critics find these conditions especially hard to bear in
complex litigation47 where a multitude of individual cases stem from the
same mass tort.45

43. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
44. Reintroduction of rules in conflicts analysis invites the prospect of automatic or mechanical
decision. Conflicts rules tend to be temtorial rules. That is, the rule asks the judge to locate
geographically a certain fact about the controversy or the parties. The geographical whereabouts of that
fact answers (or goes a long way toward answenng) the question of what law to apply. For examples
of territorial rules, see supra note 25.
The rules-versus-method debate has been simmering for some time. For opposing views, see Bruce
Posnak, ChoiceofLaw-Rules vs. Analysis: A More WorkableMarriage Than the (Second) Restatement;
A Very Well-CurriedLeflar Over Reese Approach, 40 MERCER L. REv. 869 (1989); Willis L.M. Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972).
45. See Gottesman, supra note 13, at 9.
46. Id. ("Any of the modem [conflicts) approaches would have produced indeterminacy and party
bias even if it had been adopted in identical terms by all fifty states. But the problem was compounded,
for different states adopted different theories of choice of law.").
47. The most definitive attempt to describe special problems posed in complex litigation is the
American Law Institute's work in progress, Complex LitigationProject.As elaborated in chapters 1 and
2 of the preliminary draft of the Project document, the goal is to give consolidated and uniform
treatment for claims currently addressed by multiparty, multiforum litigation. Prime examples are cases
arising from a single mass disaster, e.g., Mark W. Hams, The Propriety of Class Actions in Mass
Aviation Disaster Litigation, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 559 (1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Mass Torts and
the Conflict ofLaws: The Airline Disaster, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 157, and those directed at toxic torts,
e.g., Arthur R. Miller & Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos Personal-Injury Litigation Crisis, 10
REV. LrrIG. 419 (1991); David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage,
Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1986) (reviewing PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS
MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL

(1985)).

48. On the supposed shortcomings of current conflicts law in complex litigation, see Barbara
Atwood, The Choice ofLaw Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation, Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon and Van
Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REv. 9 (1986); Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disastersand the Conflict of Laws,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105; Mary K. Kane, Drafting Choice ofLaw Rulesfor Complex Litigation: Some
Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation,
10 REv. LITiG. 213, 223-25 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 37-41 (1986); Paul S. Bird, Note,
Mass-Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to The Choice ofLaw Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077 (1987).
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V SCHEMES FOR NATIONALIZING CONFLICTS LAW

A. Federal Conflicts Law for Complex Litigation
It is in the area of complex litigation that change in the balance between
state and federal law appears most likely to occur. Congress recently came
close to enacting choice-of-law provisions for mass tort cases,49 and a
successor bill is pending at this writing.50 In the preliminary draft of a
statute it is preparing for Congress, the American Law Institute would
regulate choice of law in complex litigation to a much greater extent.5'
Others have urged that, unless or until Congress acts, the Supreme Court
address conflicts problems posed in complex litigation through federal
common law 52
Those who would streamline choice of law in complex litigation have their
critics, 53 but the reforms they urge might not produce the shock of more
sweeping approaches to nationalize conflicts law The forms of litigation
addressed by the former, while significant, represent but a fraction of conflicts
cases. Further, the choice-of-law incongruity the reforms eliminateinconsistent conflicts results on precisely the same issues-is especially
irritating in mass tort settings, where inconsistencies occur within a single
controversy 54
Two approaches divest state courts of their conflicts power on a much
broader scale. They occupy the rest of this Article.

49. H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., IstSess. (1989). Then-Congressman Robert Kastenmeter submitted
the bill. It passed the House of Representatives easily but died in the Senate. A valuable descnption of
the bill and its fate appears in Charles G. Geyh, Complex-Litigaton Reform and the LegislativeProcess,
10 REv. LITIG. 401 (1991).
50. H.R. 2450, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill passed the House but not the Senate. For
discussion of H.R. 2450, see House Backs Consolidating Certain Kinds of Lawsuits, 49 CONG. Q.
WKLY.REP. 3535 (1991).
51. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT ch. 6 (ALI Tentative Draft No. 3, 1992). Chapter 6 was

approved by the ALI membership in May, 1992, subject to final consideration of the entire Project
document in May, 1993. The House bills, supranotes 49-50, free federal courts from state conflicts law
and authorize them to choose law with reference to a list of general criteria. Chapter 6 rejects this
approach, Kane, supra note 48, at 316-17, opting instead for a web of rules for choosing law in complex
cases that pressures (perhaps dictates) particular results.
52. Juenger, supra note 48, at 109; Rowe & Sibley, supranote 48, at 39. But cf.Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Jurisdictionaland Transfer Proposalsfor Complex Litigation, 10 REv. LrriG. 325, 333 (1991)

(questioning his own earlier preference for federal common law over a federal conflicts statute).
53. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 23-29; Linda S. Mullenix, FederalizngChoice of Law for
Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX.L. REV. 1623 (1992); Robert Sedler & Aaron Twerskt, State Choice of
Law in Mass Tort Cases:A Response to "A View from the Legislature," 73 MARQ. L. REv. 625 (1990);
Donald T. Trautman, Toward FederalizngChoice of Law, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1715 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Juenger, supra note 48; Kane, supra note 48; Lowenfeld, supra note 47.
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B. Federal Conflicts Law that
Would Compliment Modern Theory
The first approach seeks to improve the quality of conflicts decisions
without working any fundamental changes in choice-of-law theory The scale
of the project could run from incremental to broad-spectrum replacement of
state law with a federal common law of conflicts." This is a means of
addressing the court bias in favor of local interests already noted under state
conflicts law 56 To pursue its goal of neutrality, this approach would not
require elimination of interest analysis or any other component of modem
theory "7Weight could still be given to policies that might make the forum
interested in applying local law, but not disproportionate weight. 58
If close conflicts cases are capable of clearly correct results, neutral courts
might best be able to find them. 9 Unfortunately, it is not easy to assume that
close cases can ever yield clearly right results. Recall the position set out
earlier in this Article,60 that modem conflicts policies are exasperating in
application not because they are forum favoring (they are ostensibly neutral)
but because resolution of close cases through application of these policies
requires exceedingly difficult forms of legal analysis. If this is correct, a
uniform principle of forum neutrality may not address the main cause of
dissatisfaction with conflicts law
Assuming, for the sake of discussion, that decision under a rule of neutrality
would significantly reduce controversy surrounding conflicts, a federal
common law of conflicts might prove an efficient means for imposing that
rule. This would be true so long as the United States Supreme Court played
a leadership role in developing doctrine and lent sufficient muscle to enforce
it. 6' Again, however, we have encountered a difficult assumption. Given the

55. E.g., Trautman, supranote 53, at 1727 (observing that "a federal common law of choice of law
might simply provide a vehicle for incremental modulation of state choice-of-law thinking").
56. "To a large extent, the only significant contribution of federal common law to this process
would be to free state-court judges from any compulsions they might otherwise find in local law to
prefer local law or local residents
"Trautman, supra note 12, at 128.
57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (modem conflicts policies).
58. The object under federal common law would be "to provide [judges] with the intellectual
equipment needed to justify assessment of the strength of local policy andof the policy of other
concerned jurisdictions." Trautman, supra note 12, at 128.
59. A view expressed in the work of Professor Willis Reese. E.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679, 692 (1963).
60. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
61. The Supremacy Clause would require state courts to join lower federal courts in deciding
conflicts cases under a federal law standard of forum neutrality. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could
take a smaller step by merely relieving diversity courts of the obligation under the Klaxon rule, see
discussion supra text accompanying note 20, to administer state conflicts doctrine. However, it is
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many important demands on the Supreme Court's resources, it might not be
62
desirable or even possible for the Court to take on such a commitment.
Perhaps aware of this, the Supreme Court
has carefully steered clear of the
63
nonconstitutional aspects of the subject.
As an alternative to federal common law, the Supreme Court could promote
neutrality by giving more life to the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution in conflicts review Current doctrine does not
entirely delineate the separate contribution each clause makes, 64 but together
they come the closest, of any part of the Constitution, to regulating choice of
law 65 The Supreme Court could, for example, promote neutrality by
requiring under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that the forum could not
apply local state law when another state was clearly more interested in having
its law applied.66
The Court played with this idea at one point 67 but eventually discarded
it. 68 Before it reintroduces mterest balancing as a feature of constitutional
law, the Supreme Court would have to give serious thought to the possibility
that (as with conflicts as federal common law) it might become flooded with

probably easier to nationalize the entire conflicts field than to disentangle choice of law from the Erie
doctrine. See Trautman, supra note 53, at 1727-28.
62. For elaboration of the point that to make conflicts a form of federal common law would place
an unwarranted demand on scarce Supreme Court resources, see Shreve, supra note 20, at 344-45. It
would pose to the Supreme Court "the dilemma of either undertaking a debilitating amount of
superintendence through judicial review
or presiding over only the illusion of neutrality in the
choice-of-law process." Id. at 344.
63. Thus, in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), Justice Brennan, writing for the
plurality, refused to criticize Minnesota's conflicts ruling or to indicate whether the Court "would make
the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the Minnesota Supreme Court." Id. at 307. Justice Stevens
was even more to the point, conciirring: "It is not this Court's function to establish and impose upon
state courts a federal choice-of-law rule
"Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws-FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 127 (1991).
65. For a history of the two clauses in conflicts cases, see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 10, at 73103.
66. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Full Faith and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 709, 727-29 (1983). However, one expert on the Full Faith and Credit Clause has argued that any
significant expansion of the clause requires congressional action. Ralph M. Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State Choice of Laiv: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. I (1981).
67. The Court indicated then that the Full Faith and Credit Clause permitted a forum to apply its
own law because the forum's interest was not less than that of the nonforum state. Alaska Packers
Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 549 (1935); Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954). Commenting on Watson, one source observed: "The clear
implication is that the full faith and credit clause would come into play if the forum state's interests
were outweighed by the other state's interests." WILLIS L.M. REESE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 354
(9th ed. 1990).
68. State and federal diversity courts now appear free to apply local state law when the local state
is merely interested. E.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981).
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state and lower federal court cases. Such is the imprecision of interest
analysis that whenever both places are interested in the application of their
rules, "the losing side could frame the federal constitutional issue that its rule
came from a more interested place. '"69
C. Federal Conflicts Law that Would Overhaul Modern Theory
Nationalization of conflicts law might also be part of a second, more radical
approach to reform. Like the federal law proposals just discussed, a more
radical approach would displace a good deal of state law and attempt a
substantial measure of uniformity in conflicts decision making. However,
while the earlier approach aimed at enhancing the qualities of contemporary
conflicts law, the second would eradicate much of that law by attacking its
theoretical foundations. The latter is inclined to reflect a deep distrust of the
emphasis in current doctrine of method over firm rules, and of interest
analysis-particularly applications of interest analysis that appear to
disadvantage nonlocal litigants.
State courts or legislatures could implement changes responsive to these
criticisms. It is not clear, however, when or whether this would occur.
Convinced that current law should be overhauled, and perhaps irritated by
delay in state law reform, radical critics see a more direct route to change.
They would use the U.S. Constitution as a kind of scouring pad to remove the
stains of uncertainty and local bias that they find on American conflicts
law 70
Professor Douglas Laycock has offered one of the newest of such attacks.
He rejects the conventional wisdom of modem conflicts theory, announcing
that "[w]e have handled the problem badly; indeed, we have not even looked
to the right sources of law ",7' Laycock deplores the "chaotic"72 arrangement
by which states are left largely free of federal regulation in choice of law, and
he contends that "[c]hoice-of-law methods that prefer local litigants, local law,
or better law are unconstitutional."73 While the centerpiece for Laycock's

69. Shreve, supra note 35, at 68 (suggesting why the "problem the Court would make for itself
would be the same as if it created a strictly neutral federal common law of conflicts. The number of
cases encompassed by the new standard would be overwhelming") (footnotes omitted).
70. Critics in this mold include Laycock, supra note 11, Ely, supra note 11. Cf. Gottesman, supra
note 13, at 19-23 (expressing dissatisfaction with modem conflicts theory but advocating a congressional
solution).
71. Laycock, supra note 11, at 250.
72. Id. at 259.
73. Id. at 336. The two probably should be seen as separate challenges. The work of many writers
suggests that a rules approach is not invariably antithetical to interest analysis. E.g., Larry Kramer, On
the Need for a Unifonn Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2134 (1991); RUSSELL WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 362-411 (3rd ed. 1986).
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argument is the Privileges and Immunities Clause,74 a proposal to unify
conflicts law while eliminating preferential treatment of local litigants might
also draw from the Commerce 75 and Equal Protection 76 Clauses.
Is the cure worse than the disease? Like proposals in the first category,"
a regime of national conflicts law under this approach places upon the U.S.
Supreme Court responsibility for an extensive (perhaps debilitating) amount
of superintendence. The approach also requires a fair amount of tinkering with
what is now understood to be the meaning of these clauses.78 Perhaps most
important, the validity of propositions upon which such national conflicts law
rests-that rules are better than method and that locals should win only if
nonlocals would-remains open to question.
Regarding alleged forum bias, two features of this radical critique warrant
further attention. First, critics often seem to forget that domicile-based interest
analysis works both ways. Thus, while it is true that it permits forum citizens
to win cases nonresidents would have lost, it is equally true that domicilebased interest analysis permits nonresidents to win cases citizens would have
lost. Thus, when a nonresident defendant can summon anti-recovery law from
his own state and demonstrate that his state would be interested in having that
law applied to protect him, he may win a conflicts case when a defendant
residing in the forum (hence stuck with the forum's pro-recovery law) would
have lost an otherwise identical case.79 Second, critics take too little account
of state courts' capacity for principled forbearance. There are now numerous
decisions where judges regarded the forum as interested in availing a local
litigant of forum law yet applied nonforum law out of respect for concerns of
party fairness or the interests of another sovereign."0
To pursue greater deference through the imposition of firm conflicts rules
may cut too much against the grain of our legal experience to succeed. Much
of the history of American conflicts law in this century can be told in the
74. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. Professor Ely also features the clause in his analysis. Ely, supra
note 11.
75. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see supra note 9.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra note 10.
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

78. For example, corporations are at least as likely as natural persons to be victimized by forum
favoritism in choice of law; yet the Privilege and Immunities Clause currently does not protect
corporations (or resident aliens). RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.7 at 107 (2d ed. 1992).
79. For demonstration of this principle, see Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d
721 (Cal. 1978).
80. For case examples, see Weinberg, supra note 29, at 59 and Weintraub, supra note 34, at 499-

501.
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growing rejection of hard rules8 in favor of method, and the growing
distaste of lawyers, judges, and the public with conflicts law that was
mechanical and thus blind to the aims of local law and policy Much as
radical critics might try to distance themselves from the thoroughly discredited approach that modern theory replaced, s2 similarities of disfunction are
difficult to ignore. If rules ordered judges to ignore important local policies
at stake in conflicts cases, would judges be more submissive
than they were
83
fifty years ago when old theory made the same demand?
It will come as no surprise that proponents of modem theory are skeptical.84' However, so too are at least some of those with less charitable views
toward current law For example, Professor Friedrich Juenger, hardly a
supporter of the modern approach,85 observed:
Alas, it is probably too late to turn the choice-of-law clock back.
Mechanical conflicts rules, like mechanical rules in any field of law, cause
covert resistance. An attempt to return to territorial choice-of-law rules
would undoubtedly invite, on a greatly accelerated basis, the avoidance
techniques used in the past, such as overuse of the procedural category to
apply forum law, substantive labels that we make up as we go along-it is
not a "tort," it's a "contract", it is not a "tort," it's a "family law"
problem-and, of course, our old friend waiting there to snatch us from the
jaws of death, public policy. Attempts to simplify choice-of-law analysis
with rigid territorial rules have not worked before, and will not work again,
unless
we elect or appoint to courts people who have room temperature
86
IQs.

The status of territorial conflicts rules as commands under federal law might
reduce judicial insubordination, but the past record of compliance with U.S.
Supreme Court precedents is not entirely reassuring. 7 The greatest threat to
81. On the rules approach in conflicts law, see supra note 44.
82. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 11, at 322 (arguing differences between his territonal rules and
the territorial rules of early twentieth-century conflicts theory).
83. See supra note 25 (describing the old theory and its demise).
84. E.g., Bramerd Cume, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE

L.J. 171, 175 ("The courts simply will not remain always oblivious to the true operation of a system
which, though speaking the language of metaphysics, strikes down the legitimate application of the
policy of a state, especially when that state is the forum."); Trautman, supra note 53, at 1738 ("The
history of conflict of laws in the twentieth century comes to nothing if it has not been to demonstrate
the futility of mechanical tests that judges will not stomach.').
85. See JUENGER, supra note 23; Juenger, supra note 34.
86. Juenger, supra note 48, at 133 (citations omitted).
87. See generally James E. Robertson, When the Supreme Court Commands, Do the Lower Federal
Courts Obey? The Impact of Rhodes v. Chapman on CorrectionalLitigation, 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 79
(1984); Michael Wells, The Unimportance of Precedentin the Law of Federal Courts, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 357 (1989); Note, Constitutional Stare Decists, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1344 (1990); Note, Lower
Court Disavowal of Supreme CourtPrecedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494 (1974).
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the success of radical reform comes, however, from subtler possibilities of
evasion that Professor Juenger's observations suggest. Whether the strong
medicine of these proposals is desirable, and whether the Supreme Court
could succeed in forcing American judges and others to swallow that
medicine, remains to be seen.
EPILOGUE
The various possibilities for federal conflicts law could justify much more
discussion than space has permitted here. I have sketched only one part of the
subject: the curious extent to which arguments for reforming state conflicts
law also support its displacement with federal conflicts law Beyond that, my
purpose is conjectural-to explore aspects of these schemes without
attempting to settle matters for or against them. The rest of the project lies
ahead and should occupy the conflicts community for some time.

